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The critical question facing most defendants in criminal trials is whether
to testify on their own behalf. Despite the platitudinous instruction given to
jurors that a defendant's choice not to testify at trial should not affect their
deliberations,1 the defendant's failure to testify can seriously undermine his
* Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, B.A. 1978, Loyola Marymount University;
M.A. 1980, Fordham University; J.D. 1985, Georgetown University Law Center. The views expressed
in this Article are solely those of the author and do not purport to reflect the views of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice or any other federal agency. I would like to thank Marlene D. Beckman, James A.
Candelmo, and especially Karen L. McDonald for their assistance.
1. See, e.g.. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (judge must give "no-adverse-inference"
instruction concerning defendant's failure to testify upon defendant's request); Lakeside v. Oregon, 435
U.S. 333, 339-40 (1978) (judge's instruction to jury not to draw adverse inference about defendant not
testifying does not violate due process right). One pattern jury instruction states:
The defendant did not testify in this case. Under our Constitution, he has no obligation
to testify or to present any other evidence because it is the prosecution's burden to prove
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden remains with the prosecu-
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or her defense. This is because jurors will question why the defendant does
not take the stand to fight the charge.2 At the same time, however, defend-
ants who testify face the prospect of impeachment by prior convictions or
relevant bad acts. Further, the threat of close cross-examination while try-
ing to explain questionable conduct can shake even the most confident of
witnesses. The Sentencing Guidelines,8 enacted by Congress to govern all
sentences in federal courts, have now injected a new element into the de-
fendant's dilemma of whether to testify.'
The Guidelines require the trial court to increase the defendant's sen-
tence if it determines that the defendant obstructed justice, which includes
the commission of perjury at trial.6 This enhancement for perjury could
permit courts to increase automatically the sentences of defendants who
testify and are convicted.6 The rationale for this approach is that the jury
disbelieved the defendant's testimony, otherwise it would not have voted to
convict; therefore, the district court may properly find that a defendant
committed perjury based on the jury's verdict and increase the sentence.
Accordingly, under the Guidelines, defendants must now weigh whether
testifying will result in an even greater sentence than choosing to remain
silent.
Most circuit courts have relied on United States v. Grayson' to uphold
sentence enhancements based on the defendant's testimony at trial. In
Grayson, a pre-Guidelines decision, the Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant's right to testify is limited to testifying truthfully,' and therefore
increasing a sentence based on material falsehoods in the defendant's testi-
tion throughout the entire trial and never shifts to the defendant. The defendant is never
required to prove that he is innocent.
You may not attach any significance to the fact that the defendant did not testify. No
adverse inference against him may be drawn by you because he did not take the witness
stand. You may not consider this against the defendant in any way in your deliberations
in the jury room.
I LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) 5.07 at 5-49 (1988);
see also EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL.. FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 15.31 (1991 Cumu-
lative Supp.) (containing similar instruction).
2. See F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMINAL TRIALS §
16:1 (2d ed. 1985) ("in spite of any instructions [to the contrary], the majority of jurors will assume
that a defendant has something to hide, if he does not take the witness stand in his own behalf.").
3. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (West 1991)
[hereinafter GUIDELINES].
4. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, §§ 211-239, 98 Stat.
1837, 1976, 1987-2040 (codified principally at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-
998 (1988)).
5. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, § 3C1.l.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 933 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming two-level obstruction of
justice upgrade under § 3C1.L).
7. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
8. Id. at 54.
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mony at trial does not violate due process or unconstitutionally inhibit the
right to testify at trial.9 The Court noted, however, that "[n]othing we say
today requires a sentencing judge to enhance, in some wooden or reflex
fashion, the sentences of all defendants whose testimony is deemed false."' 10
The analysis of the interplay between the Guidelines and the defendant's
constitutional rights by the circuit courts has frequently been superficial
and inconsistent, resulting in sentences that appear to apply the perjury
enhancement reflexively. While some decisions closely analyze the district
court's basis for increasing the sentence in order to determine whether
there is an adequate basis for the enhancement, many appellate courts up-
hold lower courts' decisions to enhance sentences almost automatically
based solely on the defendant's conviction. For example, in United States v.
Bonds," the Second Circuit accepted the proposition that if a defendant's
testimony relates to issues involving the elements of the crime and if the
defendant is convicted, then the sentencing enhancement must be applied
because the jury disbelieved the defendant and therefore the defendant
must have committed perjury.' 2 The court never considered whether its
analysis of the Guidelines could be reconciled with Grayson's admonition
against "wooden or reflex" increases in sentences.
The Guidelines state explicitly that the obstruction enhancement is not
intended to punish defendants for exercising their constitutional rights.' 3
There is, however, a substantial question whether the current Guidelines
approach to increasing sentences based on testimony at trial unfairly inhib-
its defendants from testifying and thus unconstitutionally denies them the
right to mount a complete defense to the charges.' 4 It was precisely this
issue that led the Fourth Circuit to conclude that enhancing the defend-
ant's sentence for perjury at trial under the Guidelines because the defend-
ant denied all involvement in the crimes charged by the government and
was subsequently convicted constituted an "intolerable burden upon the de-
fendant's right to testify in his (sic] own behalf."' 5 The circuit court found
that the Guidelines create the "wooden or reflex" approach rejected by the
Supreme Court in Grayson because they allow judges to enhance sentences
9. Id. at 53, 55.
10. Id. at 55.
II. 933 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1991).
12. Id. at 155.
13. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, § 3C1.1, commentary (n.I).
14. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM.
CRiM. L. REV. 161, 223 (1991) ("Grayson not only fails to support enhancing a sentence for false
testimony at trial, it emphatically rejects the practice as unconstitutional.").
15. United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178, 185 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. granted. 60 U.S.L.W. 3798
(U.S. May 26, 1992) (No. 91-1300). The circuit court also stated, "it disturbs us that testimony by an
accused in his own defense, so basic to justice, is deemed to 'obstruct' justice unless the accused con-
vinces the jury." Id. at 183.
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based solely on the jury's vote to convict, which generally entails disbelief
of the defendant's testimony, without requiring some greater protection for
the defendant. 6
In applying the Guidelines, courts are struggling to approach cases con-
sistently. This Article reviews recent decisions concerning sentence adjust-
ments based on the defendant's perjury at trial and the different ap-
proaches the circuit courts have adopted. The Article analyzes the rationale
for enhancing a sentence based on a defendant's testimony at trial. The
Article then argues that the Sentencing Commission should provide greater
guidance concerning specific types of circumstances to which adjustments
should be applied and when sentencing courts should be more circumspect
in increasing sentences in order to avoid creating excessive burdens on de-
fendants' right to testify.
I. BACKGROUND: THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Congress established the Federal Sentencing Commission in 1984 to pro-
mulgate a system of mandatory sentencing guidelines for all federal
crimes." The basic objective of the system of mandatory guidelines is to
ensure honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing. 8 After ex-
tensive debate on the best approach for achieving those goals, the Commis-
sion adopted the Guidelines, which became effective for all crimes commit-
ted after November 1, 1987.11 The Commission has a continuing mandate
to refine the Guidelines, and it submits amendments to Congress each year
that take effect 180 days after submission unless Congress passes a law
blocking their promulgation.20
16. Id. at 184. Compare United States v. Ogbeifun, 949 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting Dunni-
gan as foreclosed by Grayson) with United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 1015 (Heaney, J., concur-
ring) (calling for en banc consideration of constitutionality of § 3C1.l in light of Dunnigan's analysis).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988). The Sentencing Commission is comprised of seven voting members
appointed by the President, of which at least three must be Article III judges, and two non-voting ex-
officio members, the Attorney General (or an authorized representative) and the chairperson of the
United States Parole Commission. Id.
18. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 2 (West 1991). The Guidelines replace the system under which
the sentencing judge had broad discretion to select a sentence within the range provided by statute, and
a prisoner could be released long before completion of the term of incarceration by the Parole Commis-
sion. Congress, among others, perceived the pre-Guidelines system as allowing for wide disparity in
sentences for similar crimes, depending on the whim of the sentencing judge. See Stephen Breyer, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1, 5 (1988) (discussing Commission's work outlining such disparities); Kathryn A. Walton, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Miracle Cure for Sentencing Disparity (Caution: Apply Only as Di-
rected), 79 Ky. L.J. 385, 390 (1991).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988); see GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 2 (Commission "'expects, and the
governing statute anticipates, that continuing research, experience, and analysis will result in modifica-
tions and revisions to the guidelines through submission of amendments to Congress.").
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The Guidelines create a charge-based system under which a sentence is
based "upon the conduct that constitutes the elements of the offense for
which the defendant was charged and of which he was convicted."121 The
court first determines the defendant's "relevant conduct" with respect to
the crimes charged,22 which requires the calculation of a numeric -"base
offense level" ranging from I to 43. The court also reviews "specific offense
characteristics" detailing certain acts or factors related to the offense, such
as the amount of drugs, that will increase or decrease the corresponding
calculation of the offense level.23 The court then makes "adjustments" to
the offense level based on certain factors described in the Guidelines. Once
the offense level is calculated, the court next reviews the defendant's past
criminal conduct to determine the "criminal history category."'" The Sen-
tencing Table provides the applicable range of sentences, calculated in
months, based on a mechanical application of the offense level and criminal
history. The higher the offense level and the greater the criminal history
category, the more prison time a defendant must serve under the Guide-
lines.2" A court may depart from the sentence provided by the Guidelines if
it finds "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sen-
tencing Commission . 28
The determination of the appropriate offense level and criminal history
category, and decisions regarding adjustments and departures, are gener-
ally based on findings of fact made by the sentencing judge. The
presentence investigation report (PSI), which contains information about
the defendant's criminal history and relevant conduct, is used by the proba-
tion officer to determine the offense level and criminal history category.27
21. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 4. The Guidelines also incorporate certain elements of a real of-
fense system by allowing the court to enhance a sentence based, for example, on the defendant's role in
the offense, the amount of loss from the criminal conduct, and other acts specifically related to the
defendant. Id. at 5. The Sentencing Commission rejected a pure real offense system, which would base
sentences on all of the defendant's conduct and not just that charged by the government, because such
an approach was impractical and would not have cured the problem of unpredictability in sentencing
present in the pre-Guidelines regime. Id.
22. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, § IBI.3.
23. Id. § 2 (Offense Conduct).
24. Id. §§ 3, 4 (Adjustments, Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood).
25. Id. § 5, part A (Sentencing Table). The Guidelines provide a range of months that a defendant
can be sentenced to by the court. The judge has discretion to choose the exact sentence within the
range provided in the Sentencing Table. The Guidelines permit a combination of imprisonment, proba-
tion, home detention or other alternatives to prison for crimes with lower offense levels and criminal
history categories that have maximum sentences of not more than ten months. Id. § 5C1.1.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). The Sentencing Commission has identified certain aggravating and
mitigating factors that it has not been able to incorporate fully in the Guidelines, e.g., if death or
physical injury resulted from the crime or if the victim's unlawful conduct contributed significantly to
provoking the offense. GUIDELINES. supra note 4, § 5, Part K.
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(A) (effective Dec. I, 1991).
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The PSI and probation officer determinations of the applicable sentence
range carry great weight with the district court.2 8 Both the defendant and
the government may appeal a sentence that "was imposed as a result of an
incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines," 9 and if the appellate
court overturns the original sentence, the case is remanded to the district
court for resentencing.30
The standard of review for sentencing decisions depends on whether the
alleged error relates to a finding of fact, in which case the appellate court
applies the "clearly erroneous" standard, or relates to an incorrect legal
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, which is a decision of law re-
viewed de novo.31 Although the circuit courts generally defer to the deci-
sions of the district judges by applying the more generous "clearly errone-
ous" standard, some circuit courts interpret the lower court's findings to be
an application of the Guidelines to the facts, subject to much closer review
under the de novo standard. 3  The government must prove the facts that
affect the sentence by a preponderance of the evidence and not by the
higher reasonable doubt standard required to convict the defendant.33
28. See Keith A. Findley & Meredith J. Ross, Access, Accuracy and Fairness: The Federal
Presentence Investigation Report under Julian and the Sentencing Guidelines, 1989 Wis. L REv. 837,
843 (especially in sentencing after guilty plea, PSI is primary tool for determining sentence under
Guidelines).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
30. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (effective Dec. 1, 1991).
31. See Braxton v. United States, I1l S. Ct. 1854, 1858 (1991) (effect of defendant's stipulation not
factual finding; reviewed as if "contract, or consent decree, or proffer for summary judgement").
32. See. e.g., United States v. Perdomo, 927 F.2d Ill (2d Cir. 1991). In Perdomo, the Second
Circuit reviewed an adjustment to the defendant's sentence based on obstructive conduct during com-
mission of the offense. The court stated that "folur review of whether the facts set out in the
presentence report constitute obstruction of justice under the Guidelines is a matter of legal interpreta-
tion, and is subject to de novo review." Id. at 118. The court adopted the higher standard of review to
justify its close analysis of the district court's decision and substituted its own judgment that the facts
in the case do not "necessarily lead to a finding of obstruction." Id. See also United States v. Lozoya-
Morales, 931 F.2d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussed infra notes 95-101).
33. United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), rev'g 883 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1989). All of the circuit courts that have considered the issue of the proper standard of proof for
factual issues affecting sentencing have followed the Supreme Court's decision in McMillan v. Pennsyl-
vania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), which upheld a state sentencing provision that permitted proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence of possession of a weapon that resulted in an increased sentence as consistent
with the due process clause. See United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 655-56 ("Every circuit that has
considered the question" adopts the preponderance of the evidence standard, citing cases); United
States v. Rafferty, 911 F.2d 227, 231 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing cases); cf. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, §
6AI.3, comment (Sentencing Commission believes preponderance standard appropriate to meet due
process requirements and policy concerns for resolving factual disputes in sentencing).
[Vol. 29:933
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II. THE SECTION 3C1M ADJUSTMENT FOR PERJURY AT TRIAL
A. The Mechanics of Section 3C.1
The Sentencing Guidelines provide five categories of adjustments to the
defendant's sentence: victim-related adjustments, role in the offense, ob-
struction, multiple counts, and acceptance of responsibility. The adjust-
ments require the court to increase or decrease the offense level if the
judge finds that the defendant engaged in certain conduct related to the
commission of the crime or the subsequent prosecution of the offense, even
though conduct is not directly encompassed by the charges on which the
defendant was convicted or pled guilty. The adjustment for conduct affect-
ing the administration of justice (i.e., obstruction), section 3C1.1 of the
Guidelines, requires a two-level sentence enhancement "[i]f the defendant
willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing
of the instant offense . . .,a
The types of conduct that the adjustment reaches fall into four basic
categories: 1) acts undertaken in connection with investigation of the crime
and arrest; 2) pretrial and post-trial statements made in court; 3) state-
ments outside of court in connection with sentencing; and 4) trial testi-
mony.38 The Application Notes to section 3CI.1 call for increased punish-
ment of a defendant for "committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn
perjury," although the Sentencing Commission states that the defendant's
testimony "should be evaluated in a light most favorable to the defend-
ant." 8 The Guidelines set out the general approach for enhancing a de-
34. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, § 3C1.L. The other obstruction adjustment applies to reckless endan-
germent during flight from a law enforcement officer. Id. § 3CI.2. The two-level enhancement can
substantially increase the sentence for defendants with higher offense levels and greater criminal history
categories. For example, a two-level increase from offense level 20 to 22 for a defendant with a crimi-
nal history category of I raises the minimum sentence from 33 months to 41 months, while an in-
creased offense level from 35 to 37, with a criminal history category of Ill, enhances the minimum
sentence over four years, from 210 months to 262 months. Id. at ch. 5 (Sentencing Table).
35. The Sentencing Guidelines provide non-exhaustive lists of conduct to which the adjustment
should and should not apply. See GUIDELINES, supra note 3, § 3C1.1, comment (nn. 3, 4). The lists
describe different degrees of conduct, but are so broad that they are open to almost any interpretation
by the sentencing court about whether particular conduct permits enhancement of the sentence. More-
over, in one instance, the lists cover the same conduct by recommending an upward adjustment for
"providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence or other inves-
tigation for the court," and recommending against an adjustment for "providing incomplete or mislead-
ing information, not amounting to a material falsehood, in respect to a presentence investigation." Id. §
3C1.1 comment (nn. 3(h), 4(c)).
36. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, § 3C1.1, comment (n. 1, 3(b)). The initial version of the Application
Note required an enhancement for "testifying untruthfully ... concerning a material fact." GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 3, at App. C, Amend. 347. The First Circuit held that the change from "testifying
untruthfully" to "perjury" is a "distinction without a difference." United States v. Rojo-Alvarez, 944
F.2d 959, 967 (Ist Cir. 1991).
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fendant's sentence based on testimony under oath:
This provision is not intended to punish a defendant for the exer-
cise of a constitutional right. A defendant's denial of guilt (other
than a denial of guilt under oath that constitutes perjury), re-
fusal to admit guilt or provide information to a probation officer,
or refusal to enter a plea of guilty is not a basis for application
of this provision. In applying this provision in respect to alleged
false testimony or statements by the defendant, such testimony or
statements should be evaluated in a light most favorable to the
defendant.3 7
The Sentencing Commission extensively amended the application notes
in 1989 to clarify the operation of the section by specifying that a denial of
guilt and a refusal to admit guilt do not constitute obstruction requiring an
enhanced sentence.38 Nevertheless, a denial of guilt at trial that the court
determines reaches the level of perjury can be the basis for enhancing a
sentence, and the Guidelines do not clearly state where the line is drawn
between a permissible denial of guilt and a denial that rises to the level of
perjury. One possible interpretation of section 3C1.1 is that a defendant
may enter a plea of not guilty, which is not under oath, but once the de-
fendant takes the stand, then she is subject to an enhanced sentence for
perjury. Once the oath is invoked, the defendant no longer merely denies
guilt but enters the realm of perjury.
The consequences of a determination that section 3C1.1 applies based on
perjury are quite severe. The trend in the circuits is that section 3C1.1
does not give the judge any discretion in imposing the two-level adjustment
once the court makes the requisite finding of perjury by the defendant. In
United States v. Austin,"' the lower court found that the defendant's testi-
mony at an evidentiary hearing relating to withdrawal of a guilty plea was
37. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, § 3C1.1, comment. (n. I).
38. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at App. C, Amend. 347 (Nov. I, 1989). Amendment 347 also reorga-
nized the application notes to section 3C1.1 by, among other things, combining two notes concerning
the defendant's right to exercise constitutional rights and to have testimony and statements considered
in the light most favorable to the defendant. Id. Application Note 1 was further amended in 1991 to
clarify that the presumption in favor of the defendant applies to the "alleged false testimony and state-
ments." Id. at App. C., Amend. 415 (Nov. I, 1991).
The Sentencing Commission's approach in this area is similar to the recognition by some circuit
courts of the "exculpatory no" defense to a false statement charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, that a
defendant who denies involvement in criminal activity in response to government inquiries should not be
punished for failing to provide inculpatory evidence. See United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d
540, 544 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1986) (adopting five-part test to determine whether "exculpatory no" defense
applies to § 1001 prosecution); OTTO G. OBERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO. WHITE COLLAR CRIME:
BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 10.02[21 at 10-42 (defense is "exceedingly difficult to define
and apply.")
39. 848 F.2d 783 (Ist Cir. 1991).
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"a hopelessly transparent, naive and misguided effort to mislead the court
which stood no chance of success before the judge."'40 The district court
refused to enhance the sentence because of the futility of the perjury and
because the testimony was before a judge and not a jury. The circuit court
reversed the sentence, holding that "where a defendant perjures himself
before the court, the court is without discretioti in imposing the two point
base offense level enhancement ....
Section 3C1.1 protects a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination by allowing a denial of guilt and a refusal to provide
other incriminating evidence to a probation officer. 42 Similarly, three circuit
courts have interpreted the acceptance of responsibility adjustment,4" which
allows a sentencing court to make a two-level downward adjustment in the
offense level, as barring the sentencing court from requiring a defendant to
accept responsibility for crimes beyond those charged by the government
because to do otherwise would violate the Fifth Amendment. 4" If the de-
40. Id. at 788.
41. Id. The court noted that if the sentencing court need not enhance the sentence if the perjury was
unsuccessful, then the adjustment would only apply to successful attempts at perjury, which "makes no
sense. How would a sentencing court know whether perjury had been committed if the false testimony
were not discovered?" Id. at 789 n.10.
The requirement that the court enhance the sentence appears to apply only if the sentencing judge
makes a separate finding that the defendant committed perjury, rather than on the basis of a guilty
verdict by a jury. See United States v. Alvarez, 927 F.2d 300, 303 (6th Cir.) ("having made the
finding that Alvarez testified untruthfully as to a material fact while under oath, the district court had
no discretion under the Sentencing Guidelines in applying § 3C1.1."), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2246
(1991): United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 21 ("Section 3C1.L of the Sentencing Guide-
lines requires the sentencing court to increase the base offense level by two points" if the defendant
obstructs justice); cf. United States v. Fuentes, Nos. 89-5198, 89-5217, 89-5240, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1474, *21-23 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 1991) ("decision of whether particular perjury actually consti-
tutes obstruction of justice, however, is left to the discretion of the trial court judge.") The Fourth
Circuit remanded the sentencing in Fuentes for the district court to determine whether the defendant's
perjury reached the level of obstruction of justice, and the court broadly hinted that it believes her false
testimony calls for an enhanced sentence. See id. at *23-24 ("we believe that the desire to balance the
sentences of the co-defendants does not constitute a basis for finding that perjury did not amount to
obstruction of justice.") Ironically, the district court's subsequent enhancement of the defendant's sen-
tence for perjury was later reversed by the Fourth Circuit because of the holding in Dunnigan that
§ 3C1.L is unconstitutional as applied to defendants who testify. See infra note 94.
42. See United States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1347-48 (7th Cir. 1991) (Application Note I
provides additional guidance distinguishing between defendants who affirmatively mislead authorities
and those who "simply exercise their constitutional right to refrain from incriminating themselves to
authorities by denying wrongdoing."). In Thompson, the defendants denied using cocaine while on bail,
but tested positive for the drug. The district court enhanced the sentences under section 3C1.L for lying
to the probation officer about the drug use, and the circuit court reversed the adjustment. Id.
43. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, § 3EI.lI "If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and
affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct, reduce the offense level by 2
levels." Id.
44. United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Perez-
Franco, 873 F.2d 455 (Ist Cir. 1989). In Oliveras, the Second Circuit stated:
So long as the defendant's statements are not immunized against use in subsequent crimi-
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:933
fendant testifies at trial and is found to have committed perjury, however,
there is no Fifth Amendment violation if the sentencing court denies a
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because the defend-
ant did not admit to the perjury."5
B. The Haphazard Approach to Section 3C.1 for Perjury at Trial
While defendants in federal criminal trials have a constitutional and
statutory right to testify,' the Supreme Court in Grayson held that there
is no license to commit perjury."7 The key to allowing the sentencing court
to increase the defendant's sentence in Grayson was the judge's unique per-
spective on the defendant's demeanor and credibility, a judicial prerogative
the Supreme Court was unwilling to constrict or second guess.' The
Guidelines have applied Grayson through section 3C1.1 by allowing courts
to enhance a sentence for "committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn
nal prosecutions, the effect of requiring a defendant to accept responsibility for crimes
other than those to which he pled guilty or of which he has been found guilty is to
penalize him for refusing to incriminate himself. This runs afoul of the fifth amendment.
905 F.2d at 626.
The Third Circuit took a more restrictive approach to determining whether denial of the adjustment
violates the Fifth Amendment, stating that "when the defendant has consistently asserted the privilege
as to acts beyond those of the offense of conviction, the judge cannot rely on the defendant's failure to
admit to such acts as a basis for denying the two-level reduction." United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d
650, 663 (3d Cir. 1991). The court advised lower courts that the sentencing judge could consider all
other evidence in the record to determine whether the section 3E1.I adjustment should be applied, and
that the reduction for defendants asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege is not automatic. Id. Other
circuits have held that defendants can be required to accept responsibility for conduct beyond that
charged by the government. See, e.g., United States v. Mourning, 914 F.2d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 1990)
(requiring defendant to accept responsibility for "all relevant criminal conduct"); United States v.
Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936-37 (4th Cir.) (denying reduction where defendant admitted to simple pos-
session of cocaine but not to intent to distribute since defendant must accept "all" criminal conduct),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 131 (1990).
45. United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010 (1 Ith Cir. 1989). The Sentencing Guidelines originally
barred an Acceptance of Responsibility adjustment if the court enhanced a sentence under section
3C1.1. See United States v. Reynolds, 900 F.2d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding courts unani-
mously agree that prior to amendment of section 3EI.I dual findings of obstruction of justice and
acceptance of responsibility were precluded). In 1989, the Sentencing Commission amended Application
Note 4 to provide that "[clonduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Imped-
ing the Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibil-
ity for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under
both §§ 3C1.1 and 3EI.l may apply." GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at App. C, Amend. 258 (Nov. I,
1989).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3841 (1986). The statute provides that criminal defendants are competent witnesses
at trial, rejecting the common law presumption that defendants were not competent to testify. Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 296 n.9 (1981).
47. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 54.
48. "No rule of law, even one garbed in constitutional terms, can prevent improper use of firsthand
observations of perjury. The integrity of the judges, and their fidelity to their oaths of office, necessarily
provide the only, and in our view adequate, assurance against that." Id. at 53.
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perjury." Some district courts state the factual basis for imposing the sec-
tion 3C1.1 adjustment for perjury,"' similar to the findings of the district
court upheld in Grayson. In most instances, however, the sentencing judge
does not go beyond a cursory statement at a hearing that since the defend-
ant's testimony amounted to perjury, it served as the basis for applying the
enhancement.50
Despite the consequences of a finding of perjury, the Guidelines do not
provide any standard by which the judge should determine whether the
defendant has committed perjury. Nor do they dictate what findings, if
any, should be made on the record to support an adjustment based on the
defendant's trial testimony. This indeterminacy in the Guidelines has led
district courts to take a haphazard approach to determining whether the
defendant has committed perjury. In some cases, it has forced the circuit
courts to scour trial court records for some colorable basis to uphold
adjustments.
Some district courts have characterized defendants' testimony as unbe-
lievable without identifying whether a specific aspect of the testimony
amounted to perjury, or whether the court based its determination on its
own observation of the witness's demeanor. In applying the section 3C1.1
adjustment for perjury, judges have described defendants' testimony as a
"cock and bull story,"51 a "batch of lies,""2 "pure fantasy,"53 and as "the
third most incredible statement offered by a defendant in a proceeding
which has come before" the court.54 Courts have also enhanced sentences
for perjury for defendants who baldly asserted that they were not involved
in the illegal activity, 55 or who testified to highly suspect alibis to explain
their presence at the crime scene or involvement in the transaction.56
49. See United States v. Head, 927 F.2d 1361, 1372 (6th Cir.) (comparing testimony of defendant
with physical evidence and other testimony to support conclusion that defendant lied under oath), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 144 (1991).
50. See Heaney, supra note 14, at 164 ("[ulnless a sentencing court has departed from the guide-
lines range or imposed a sentence other than that recommended by the probation office, the reasons
given often are stated in conclusory terms that parrot the language of the presentence report").
51. United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 228 (Ist Cir. 1991).
52. United States v. Contreras, 937 F.2d 1191, 1194 (7th Cir. 1991).
53. United States v. Barbosa, 906 F.2d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 394 (1990).
54. United States v. Welch, 945 F.2d 1378, 1386 (7th Cir. 1991).
55. United States v. Torres-Rodriguez, 930 F.2d 1375, 1390 (9th Cir. 1991) (defendant convicted of
drug trafficking testified he was unaware of presence of drugs and not involved in conspiracy); United
States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir.) (defendant convicted of conspiracy to manufacture am-
phetamines denied all involvement in drug operation), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3252 (1990). United
States v. Wagner, 884 F.2d 1090 (8th Cir. 1989) (defendant convicted of manufacturing
methamphetamine denied having key to footlocker, ever having seen footlocker, or knowing chemicals
required to manufacture drugs were in footlocker), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1088 (1990).
56. See United States v. Brum, 948 F.2d 817 (1st Cir. 1991 ) (defendant convicted of cocaine posses-
sion testified that cash found on husband was being held from her mother's fiftieth anniversary party,
but anniversary was after arrest); United States v. Welch, 945 F.2d at 1385 (defendant convicted of
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The circuit courts are generally unwilling to overturn a district court's
decision to enhance the sentence based on the defendant's untruthful testi-
mony at trial. The courts rely on the clearly erroneous standard of review
to uphold sentences in which the judge makes only a minimal finding of
fact as to perjury. 57 In United States v. Wallace, 8 the court stated
"[a]lthough the district court did not specifically identify which portions of
Wallace's testimony it believed to be false, this does not preclude our af-
firming the district court's enhancement under section 3C1.1."59 The cir-
cuit court then reviewed the defendant's testimony to find internal contra-
dictions and inconsistent statements to demonstrate perjury in support of
the enhanced sentence. Similarly, in United States v. Akitoye,60 the First
Circuit stated "[a]lthough it would have been better practice had the dis-
trict court specifically identified the segments of Akitoye's testimony it
found to be false, this omission does not preclude affirmance of its finding
in an instance where, as here, the record speaks eloquently for itself.""1
The best explanation for upholding sentencing enhancements for perjury
where the district court makes only minimal findings is that the alternative
available to the circuit court, remanding the case for more particular find-
ings, will rarely if ever alter the outcome. If a sentencing judge concluded
conspiracy to distribute cocaine testified he gave coconspirator money to purchase car, was repaid with
profit on same day after car was sold); United States v. Head, 927 F.2d 1361 (6th Cir.) (defendant
convicted of crack distribution testified he was in kitchen of small apartment playing craps, won
marked money in game), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 144 (1991). United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927
F.2d 14 (lst Cir. 1991) (defendant convicted of possession of heroin testified he was only in apartment
used to package drugs to borrow cousin's car); United States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d 945 (6th
Cir.) (defendant convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine testified that coconspirators lied about his
involvement and that he was in apartment containing drugs and weapons to feed coconspirator's dog),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 899 (1989).
57. Appellate courts have upheld decisions refusing to enhance the defendant's sentence despite evi-
dence in the record that would support a finding of perjury. In United States v. McDonald, 935 F.2d
1212 (11th Cir. 1991), the circuit court stated that:
[a]lthough the district court found that portions of [defendant]'s testimony were severely
compromised by the testimony of more credible witnesses, it found that these inconsisten-
cies did not rise to such a level as to require an upward adjustment of his sentence. After
reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that this determination was clearly erroneous.
Id. at 1219. The Eleventh Circuit in McDonald was clearly uncomfortable with the failure to enhance
the sentence, and with granting an Acceptance of Responsibility downward adjustment, but it adhered
to the policy of deferring to the district court's judgment. See also United States v. Stubbs, 944 F.2d
828, 836 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[w]hile the government points out apparent contradictions in defendant's
trial testimony, we are unconvinced that the examples offered justify" reversing district court's refusal
to enhance sentence for perjury).
58. 904 F.2d 603 (11th Cir. 1990).
59. Id. at 605.
60. 923 F.2d 221 (Ist Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 229. The court went on to find that the defendant's testimony "can most charitably be
described as fanciful." Id.; see also United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d at 1541 (reviewing record to
determine factual basis for adjustment based on perjury).
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there was perjury without specifically identifying the basis for the enhance-
ment, then requiring another hearing will only prolong the process without
any real prospect that the judge will reach a different conclusion.
That rationale obscures a deeper problem with upholding district courts
that do not make a genuine attempt to describe the factual basis for decid-
ing the defendant committed perjury during his trial. A district court's
conclusion that the defendant committed perjury may be grounded primar-
ily on the jury's disbelief of the defendant's witness stand denial of knowl-
edge or involvement in the criminal activity, rather than on an independent
appraisal of the facts and circumstances of the defendant's testimony based
on the judge's observation of the defendant. The court's independent judg-
ment is the key to protecting a defendant's right to deny charges without
risking retribution solely because he forced the government to meet its bur-
den of proof: guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Circuit courts, however, have supported the approach of relying on the
jury's verdict as the basis for enhancing sentences. In United States v.
Wagner, 2 the Eighth Circuit stated that the district court's conclusion that
the defendant's testimony was untruthful was "in keeping with the jury
verdict," and upheld the enhancement. 63 In United States v. Barbosa," the
Ninth Circuit never referred to any independent finding of the district
court, stating only that it found an adjustment for perjury was not clear
error where the defendant's "story at 'trial and the government's presenta-
tion of circumstantial evidence contradicted his claimed lack of knowledge
about the cocaine . "..."65 In United States v. Bafia 6 the Seventh Circuit
upheld the enhancement by noting tersely that "[gliven the verdict of the
jury, the district court could only find that Bafia lied." 7
In Wagner, Barbosa, and Bafia, the circuit courts relied on the jury's
verdict alone to justify enhancing a sentence. These courts made no effort
to ascertain whether the testimony amounted to perjury or whether the
sentencing court had based the enhancement on an independent determina-
tion of the defendant's testimony. Simply relying on the jury verdict under-
cuts the admonition in Grayson that increasing a defendant's sentence
based on untruthful testimony must not be applied in a "wooden or reflex
fashion." 8 The net effect is to eliminate an important safeguard to protect-
ing a defendant's right to go to trial and testify.69
62. 884 F.2d 1090 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1088 (1990).
63. Id. at 1098.
64. 906 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 394 (1990).
65. Id. at 1370.
66. 949 F.2d 1465 (7th Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 1477.
68. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55.
69. A similar problem arises when a defendant testifies at a bench trial and is convicted. In United
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III. CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO ENHANCEMENTS UNDER SECTION
3C1.L FOR PERJURY AT TRIAL
The jury's role in a criminal trial is to weigh the evidence to determine
whether the government has met its burden of proving guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. When the defendant testifies, her statements are usually
(but not always) exculpatory, such that if the jury believed her it would
have a reasonable doubt. When the court assesses whether the defendant's
testimony constitutes perjury, the jury's decision to reject the testimony
and thus convict the defendant will never be completely divorced from the
judge's decision on sentencing. A fundamental issue that the Guidelines do
not address, however, is whether the jury's verdict can be the sole basis for
enhancing the defendant's sentence under section 3C1.1, and what findings
the court should make in determining whether the defendant's testimony
constitutes perjury requiring an enhanced sentence.
A. United States v. Bonds: Automatic Enhancement for Perjury at
Trial
In United States v. Bonds,7" the Second Circuit adopted an analysis that
allows courts to increase the sentences of defendants Who testify, based on
the jury's vote to convict. Bonds was convicted of three counts of knowingly
passing counterfeit currency71 after testifying that he did not know the
money he distributed was counterfeit. 2 The district court found that Bonds
lied in denying knowledge that the currency was counterfeit. However, the
appellate court did not affirm on the basis that the enhancement was not
clearly erroneous. Instead, it reviewed the adjustment de novo to determine
whether the facts constituted obstruction of justice under the Guidelines.73
The appellate court held that "by finding Bonds guilty of knowingly dis-
tributing counterfeit money, the jury necessarily determined that the
States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1991), the district court found the defendant guilty of sexual
abuse, rejecting his testimony denying penile penetration and finding that the defendant did not testify
truthfully. Id. at 752. In cases tried before the court in which a defendant's testimony goes beyond
arguing a mistake, the judgment of conviction will automatically support a finding of perjury because
the court's findings of fact require it to disbelieve the defendant. Defendants testifying in bench trials
run a heightened risk of having their sentences enhanced for perjury because the judge's credibility
determinations will affect both the guilt and sentencing phases. See also United States v. Batista-
Polanco, 927 F.2d 14 (Ist Cir. 1991) (defendant convicted after bench trial of conspiracy to distribute
heroin in which judge characterized testimony denying knowledge of narcotics as "incredible").
70. 933 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 153.
72. Id. at 155.
73. Id. at 154-55. The district court also enhanced the sentence for obstruction of justice because the
defendant had changed his appearance after receiving a grand jury subpoena for fingerprints and a
photograph. The circuit court held that a change in appearance alone without evidence of an intent to
deceive is an insufficient basis for an adjustment under § 3C1.1. Id.
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money he had distributed was counterfeit. '74 The court stated that "be-
cause there is no indication that the judgment of conviction was invalid, it
is clear that Bonds's testimony was objectively false." 75 Unless there was
insufficient evidence to support the verdict, the conviction alone provided
the necessary support for the enhancement. The Second Circuit went on to
state that "[w]here, as here, the defendant's testimony relates to an essen-
tial element of his offense, such as his state of mind or his participation in
the acts charged in the indictment, the judgment of conviction necessarily
constitutes a finding that the contested testimony was false."7" The court
asserted that "[t]his holding, however, should not be interpreted as author-
izing sentencing judges to impose obstruction of justice upgrades whenever
a defendant has testified on his own behalf."'7 7 While the Second Circuit
sought to soften the blow in Bonds by stating that the section 3C1.1 ad-
justment should not be applied automatically, it nevertheless determined
that a jury verdict alone can support an enhanced sentence.
The analysis adopted in Bonds means that most jury verdicts can allow a
district court to enhance the defendant's sentence without any independent
evaluation of the testimony if the verdict can be supported by the evidence.
This is a notoriously lenient standard. The Bonds court tried to limit the
breadth of its opinion by stating that the defendant's testimony must relate
to an essential element of the offense.78 This limitation is not meaningful,
however, because most testimony by the accused relates, at least in part, to
knowledge, identity, or intent, which are elements of virtually every federal
crime. Unless the testimony is completely inculpatory, a court would have
little trouble finding that a defendant's testimony related to an essential
element. Therefore, the judgment of conviction will usually support an en-
hanced sentence for perjury under the analysis in Bonds.
Notwithstanding its breadth, Bonds is a logical approach for appellate
courts that review a large number of sentencing challenges in which the
record is barren of factual findings regarding perjury. This is especially
true where the likely effect of remanding a sentence is that the judge will
make the necessary statements on the record to support the section 3C1.1
adjustment.7 Focusing on the sufficiency of the jury verdict and the sub-
74. Id. at 155 (emphasis in original).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. "Where, by contrast, the testimony relates to matters that do not, in themselves, determine
the defendant's guilt or innocence, the jury could reasonably return a verdict of guilty even though it
believes that the defendant's testimony was truthful. Under those circumstances, a judgment of convic-
tion alone would ordinarily be an insufficient basis for imposing a section 3C1.1 upgrade." Id.
79. See Heaney, supra note 14, at 163-64 & n.] I (increasing number of appeals of sentencing deci-
sions diverts judicial resources).
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ject matter of the defendant's testimony permits the appellate court to sup-
ply on its own the necessary link to uphold the sentence without remanding
the case for another hearing. The danger with the Bonds approach is that
the conviction will make enhancement automatic, forcing defendants to
choose between testifying, with the risk of an enhanced sentence, and re-
maining silent, with the risk that the jury will construe their silence to be a
tacit admission of guilt.
B. United States v. Dunnigan: Unconstitutional Application of Section
3C.1 to Perjury at Trial
In United States v. Dunnigan,8" the Fourth Circuit went to the opposite
extreme from Bonds in holding that section 3C1.1 imposes an intolerable
burden on the defendant's right to testify. Dunnigan was convicted of one
count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine after testifying at trial that she
did not buy, sell, or use cocaine.81 The district court enhanced her sentence
under section 3C1.L based on a finding that she testified untruthfully at
trial. 82
The circuit court stated that its "sense of justice" required the reversal
of Dunnigan's sentence because the court feared "that this enhancement
will become the commonplace punishment for a convicted defendant who
has had the audacity to deny the charges against him." '83 The court noted
that the Guidelines permit enhancement of a sentence based on hindsight
that deems testimony disbelieved by the jury to be a lie.84 That presents
defendants with the dilemma of whether to run the risk of testifying and
having the court find they committed perjury if they are convicted, or re-
maining silent and running the increased risk of conviction because of their
silence.85 In light of potential problems with testifying, such as impeach-
ment by prior convictions, the court concluded that "[w]ith an automatic
section 3C1.1 enhancement added to the ante, the defendant may not think
testifying is worth the risk."86
The Court also held that the Guidelines did not meet Grayson's require-
ment for flexibility because section 3C1.1 increased sentences in the
"wooden or reflex fashion" rejected by the Supreme Court.87 The Fourth
Circuit found that the Guidelines do not provide sufficient protection
80. 944 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3798 (U.S. May 26, 1992) (No. 91-
1300).
81. Id. at 181.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 183.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. id. at 184 (footnote omitted).
87. Id.
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against the automatic application of the adjustment based solely on the
jury's verdict. The "clearly erroneous" standard of review applied by appel-
late courts means that "in light of the jury's verdict of guilt, the district
court's findings will never be 'clearly erroneous' where the verdict is sus-
tainable . . . Our review of these enhancements would therefore be an
empty ritual." 8
Dunnigan is important because the court clearly identifies the problem
that section 3C1.1 may affect the rights of innocent defendants by forcing
them to consider the effect of their testimony on sentencing. As the Su-
preme Court has recognized, there are reasons why innocent defendants
may not wish to testify:
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand
though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive ti-
midity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain
transactions of a suspicious character, and offences charged
against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a de-
gree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him. It
is not every one, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly
be placed on the witness stand.89
All challenges to perjury enhancements involve a defendant who has
been convicted. While there are many close cases in which a jury struggles
to decide whose story to believe, once a defendant who took the stand is
convicted, the presumption is that he told a bald-faced lie. The fact that a
defendant has been convicted, however, does not negate the possibility that
the defendant told the truth. At a minimum, the issue may be so close that
one cannot always say with confidence that perjury was committed. While
the Guidelines attempt to create a consistent system of sentences, the
Fourth Circuit correctly identified the problem that automatic application
of section 3C1.1 for perjury may infringe on an important right of defend-
ants by causing them to forgo testifying at trial.
The result in Dunnigan is problematic, however, because, as the circuit
court apparently acknowledges, the overwhelming weight of evidence in the
case supported the conclusion that the defendant lied on the stand. Not
only did five witnesses, all co-conspirators, testify against her, but after her
testimony the government presented a "devastating rebuttal."9 Dunnigan's
position was similar to that of many other defendants in drug trials who
88. Id. at 185. The court also found the Guidelines statement that the defendant's statments should
be viewed "in a light most favorable to the defendant" to be almost meaningless because "[w]hatever
light is held to it, a defendant's testimony that has been apparently rejected in material respects by a
jury will almost always compel a finding of untruthfulness." Id.
89. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
90. United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 181.
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testify that they were simply not involved in the illegal activity in ques-
tion.91 Since it is virtually impossible to refute the presence of illegal drugs
or marked money at the scene of the crime, defendants in Dunnigan's posi-
tion have few alternatives in presenting a defense but to take the witness
stand and testify that they are completely innocent. While the Fourth Cir-
cuit makes an important point that automatic application of the perjury
enhancement is both likely under the Guidelines and probably unconstitu-
tionally applied in certain cases, the facts in Dunnigan support applying
the section 3C1.1 adjustment as it is presently written to enhance the
sentence.
The Dunnigan decision is also unclear because it never states the exact
reason for the sentence reversal. The court declares the application of sec-
tion 3C1.1 offensive to its sense of justice, and states that automatic appli-
cation of the enhancement cannot be supported by reference to Grayson,
but it does not explain why the application of the Guidelines violates a
defendant's constitutional rights. Although the decision refers to other cir-
cuits that have upheld the constitutionality of section 3C1.1, 92 it never ex-
plicitly states that the provision is (or is not) unconstitutional. 3 What
guidance district courts can draw from Dunnigan is not readily apparent
because the circuit court did not announce which procedures judges should
follow to enhance a sentence for perjury.94
Bonds and Dunnigan represent the polar extremes in applying the section
3C1.1 adjustment to the defendant's testimony at trial. The sentencing
court's determination of perjury may entail little more than a perfunctory
statement on the record that masks an automatic application of an upward
adjustment based solely on the jury's guilty verdict. The Bonds rationale
allows appellate courts to validate enhanced sentences by using the jury as
a substitute for an independent factual determination by the judge. Dunni-
gan exposes the problems with applying section 3C1.1 by rote, but it goes
too far by attacking any use of the defendant's testimony as the basis for
enhancing a sentence.
91. See supra note 56 (citing cases).
92. United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 183.
93. The circuit court also does not explain whether testimony that goes beyond denying any involve-
ment in the alleged crimes, such as an alibi defense, can be the basis for an enhanced sentence, or if §
3C1.1 cannot be applied to any testimony by a defendant at trial.
94. In a recent Fourth Circuit case, the appellate court vacated a two level upward adjustment for
obstruction of justice based on the court's previous decision in Dunnigan. United States v. Fuentes, No.
91-5810 (4th Cir. Jan. 29, 1992). The court did not discuss the reason for denying the enhancement
other than the fact that "Dunnigan requires that we vacate the sentence imposed on Fuentes." Id. at 2.
See also United States v. Smith, No. 91-5600 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 1992) (reversing enhancement for
perjury at trial based on Dunnigan); United States v. Copeland, No. 90-5849 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 1992)
(same).
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C. United States v. Lozoya-Morales: Is Requiring District Courts to
Make Findings of Fact an Effective Solution?
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of enhancing a defendant's sen-
tence based solely on a guilty verdict in United States v. Lozoya-
Morales.95 Two defendants, Morales and Sanchez, were convicted of one
count of distribution of cocaine and one count of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine and acquitted of a second distribution count.96 The key witness was
a third coconspirator who had earlier pled guilty and cooperated with the
government. The circuit court stated that the jury believed only part of the
third coconspirator's story, as evidenced by the failure to convict the de-
fendants on one distribution count. Both defendants testified at trial, deny-
ing their involvement in the drug transaction, and both received enhanced
sentences under section 3C1.l. The court explicitly found that Morales had
lied in his testimony, but made no specific finding about perjury by
Sanchez.97
The district court based Sanchez's perjury adjustment solely on the basis
of the jury's verdict. The court concluded that the jury must have rejected
Sanchez's testimony because it convicted him. The Seventh Circuit held
that an automatic enhancement for defendants who testify and are con-
victed, absent specific findings by the sentencing court, unconstitutionally
impinges on the right to testify in cases where the jury's verdict does not
necessarily mean that the defendant lied.98 The circuit court "strongly
urge[d] district courts in other cases where a sentence is to be increased
because of a defendant's trial testimony to make the independent finding
95. 931 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1991).
96. Id. at 1217.
97. Id. With regard to Sanchez, the district judge stated, "[I]'m punishing him for testifying un-
truthfully. The jury found that he testified untruthfully because they believed that he had in fact been
involved in the distribution of cocaine." Id. at 1218. Sanchez testified that he never handed anything to
the third coconspirator, and the jury's acquittal on one count may have been based on believing
Sanchez's testimony on that issue. Id. at 1218 n.2.
98. Id. at 1219. "In basing Sanchez's adjustment solely upon the jury verdict, the District Court
acted in the 'wooden or reflex fashion' that is not authorized by Grayson. Sanchez testified and the jury
found him guilty, but the jury's verdict in this case says nothing about whether Sanchez lied." Id.
The court used the de novo standard to review the district court's sentence, stating that "[tihe ques-
tion before us involves a legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. ... Id. at 1218. That
approach demonstrates how slippery the standard of review can be and how the circuit courts prefer not
to overturn district courts under the "clearly erroneous" standard, but adopt the de novo standard to
justify vacating a sentence. The district court in Lozoya-Morales made no factual finding, which could
have allowed the circuit court to find that Sanchez's sentence involved clear error. Instead, the Seventh
Circuit asserted that it was reviewing the district court's interpretation of the Guidelines. Given the
district court's minimal attention to the reason for enhancing Sanchez's sentence, it is disingenuous to
claim the lower court's legal interpretation is being reviewed when it made neither a legal interpreta-
tion nor a factual finding.
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that we have required here."" Absent such a finding, the court stated that
the record must "clearly demonstrate that the jury must have found such a
falsehood."' 100
Despite the hortatory language used by the court, the specific finding
urged by the Seventh Circuit can, in fact, be rather superficial. In consid-
ering Morales' sentence, the court held that the district judge's statement
that "I believe that Mr. Morales did lie about his involvement" was a suffi-
cient independent factual determination to support enhancing the sentence
for perjury. 10
The Seventh Circuit's solution in Lozoya-Morales to the question of au-
tomatic sentence enhancements for defendants who testify is an important
step in the right direction because it requires sentencing judges to make at
least a minimal statement on the record identifying the basis for the sec-
tion 3C1.1 adjustment-a more formal structure than provided in the
Guidelines. The decision does not, however, address the more fundamental
questions of why the jury's verdict should ever serve as the basis for en-
hancing a defendant's sentence, and of whether the Guidelines are so broad
that they allow both district and circuit courts to make perfunctory find-
ings about perjury while actually relying on the jury's verdict to justify
increasing the sentence.
The problem with increasing a defendant's sentence for lying under oath
is that the Guidelines approach perjury as a simple conclusion that a judge
can draw without distinguishing between the effects perjury can have on
the outcome of a trial. Treating all instances of perjury equally allows dis-
trict courts to use the jury's verdict as an automatic validation of the deci-
sion to enhance a sentence without necessarily furthering the goals of the
Guidelines or protecting the rights of defendants. Moreover, on-the-record
statements that the judge believes the defendant committed perjury will not
necessarily prevent courts from automatically enhancing sentences based
solely on the jury's verdict. Thus, there is a continuing tension between (1)
section 3C1.1, which gives sentencing courts discretion to determine that a
defendant committed perjury and thus to increase the sentence; and (2)
99. Id. at 1219.
100. Id. at 1220 (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 1220. See also United States v. Cochran, Nos. 90-2114 to 90-2116, 90-2176 and 90-
2705, 1992 WL 15354, at *8 (7th Cir. Feb. 3, 1992) (upholding district court enhancement of sentence
for perjury because defendant "did not simply deny his guilt, he chose to take the stand and tell his
story"); United States v. Davis, 938 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 1991) (district court statement that de-
fendant "attempted to mislead the jury as to his knowledge and participation ... in the theft" suffi-
cient to support enhancement for perjury under Lozoya-Morales); United States v. Contreras, 937 F.2d
1191, 1194 (7th Cir. 1991) (district court statement that defendant "not truthful on the witness stand"
sufficient to support enhancing sentence for perjury under Lozoya-Morales); cf. Heaney, supra note 14,
at 164 (statements by district judges in sentencing are in conclusory terms parroting presentence
report).
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Grayson's admonition that enhancing a sentence based on the defendant's
testimony should not be applied in a "wooden or reflex fashion." 102 The
next section analyzes the different effects perjury can have on the outcome
of a trial and proposes a more precise approach the courts and the Sen-
tencing Commission should take in enhancing sentences based on the de-
fendant's testimony.
IV. A PROPOSED APPROACH FOR ENHANCING SENTENCES FOR PERJURY
AT TRIAL UNDER THE GUIDELINES
The goal of the Obstruction provision of the Guidelines is to protect the
truth-finding function of the court and thereby ensure the proper disposi-
tion of criminal charges by deterring conduct that interferes with the judi-
cial process.' The Application Notes to section 3C1.1 describe a broad
range of such conduct relating to the entire criminal process from the in-
vestigation through the sentencing of the defendant, including influencing
witnesses, destroying or concealing evidence, escaping from custody, and
providing materially false information. 104 The enhancement for perjury is
not limited to testimony at trial, but also includes testimony at a suppres-
sion hearing, at sentencing, and on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 10 5
Adjustments for perjury at these pre- and post-trial hearings, however, do
not present the problem of an automatic enhancement because there is no
jury verdict. Moreover, there will be factual findings on the record because
the judge usually states the reasons for concluding that the defendant's tes-
timony is false as part of his decision.
The jury's role in reaching a verdict frequently involves deciding who is
lying. Perjury by defendants at trial strikes directly at the court's fact-
finding function because it can lead the judge and the jury into making an
erroneous decision. Trials are not simple events, and therefore the defend-
ant's perjury can have different effects on the determination of the facts
102. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55.
103. See United States v. Teta, 918 F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying § 3C1.L to both
conduct that may affect the truth-finding function and conduct that may hinder progress of a case
without the use of deceit); United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting defini-
tion of obstruction that is limited to conduct only affecting truth-finding function).
104. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, § 3C1.l, comment (n.3). See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 902 F.2d
324 (5th Cir. 1990) (lying to probation officer about prior convictions); United States v. Shoulberg, 895
F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1990) (threatening letter to codefendant about possible witness); United States v.
Cain, 881 F.2d 980 (1 Ith Cir. 1989) (attempting to destroy evidence); United States v. Franco-Torres,
869 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1989) (shooting at pursuing law enforcement officers).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Austin, 948 F.2d 783 (Ist Cir. 1991) (perjury at a Rule 32 hearing
to withdraw guilty plea); United States v. Hamilton, 929 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1991) (perjury at sen-
tencing); United States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64 (Ist Cir. 1991) (perjury at hearing on motion to
dismiss and at sentencing); United States v. Matos, 907 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1990) (perjury at suppres-
sion hearing); United States v. Christman, 894 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1990) (perjury at sentencing).
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relating to guilt. If the defendant commits perjury at trial, there are five
possible results:
1. The defendant is acquitted of all charges.
2. The defendant is acquitted of some charges but convicted of
others."o6
3. The defendant is convicted of all charges.
4. The defendant is convicted (of all or only some charges), but
commits perjury to protect a codefendant who does not testify.
5. The jury cannot reach a unanimous verdict and a mistrial is
declared.
The worst-case scenario is the first one listed above, in which the perjury
has completely corrupted the fact-finding function by allowing the defend-
ant to avoid conviction altogether. The Guidelines, however, cannot deter
perjury that has this effect because the defendant will never be sentenced
for the charges, and it is highly unlikely that a separate perjury prosecu-
tion could be mounted successfully. Similarly, the Guidelines have no di-
rect application to the fifth scenario, because in order for there to be an
effect, the government must decide whether to retry the defendant and the
new jury must vote to convict. United States v. Stout,07 however, presents
a rare case in which the defendant was punished for perjury even though
the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The district court enhanced the
defendant's sentence when the defendant pled guilty to knowing possession
of counterfeit currency after his testimony that he did not know the money
was counterfeit led to a hung jury. The judge found that Stout perjured
himself during the trial regarding his knowledge of the money, and the
Ninth Circuit held that "the relevant issue of guilty knowledge was at is-
sue in both charges and [Stout]'s perjury obstructed the government's at-
tempt to prove that guilty knowledge."' 0 8
The second scenario, in which the defendant is convicted of some charges
but acquitted of others, presents a clear circumstance in which the sentence
should be enhanced if the court can determine that the acquittal was
based, at least in part, on the perjured testimony. In United States v.
106. A variation on this scenario is when the defendant is convicted of some charges and the jury
cannot reach a verdict on the other counts, requiring the court to declare a mistrial as to those charges.
107. 936 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1991).
108. Id. at 435. An interesting case would be if the defendant was convicted after retrial and did not
testify in the second trial. Could the court, assuming it was the same judge for both trials, enhance the
sentence for the perjury at the first trial when there was no perjury by the defendant in the trial that
resulted in the conviction? The Guidelines do not limit the timing of the perjury, or require that it be
limited to the trial that resulted in the conviction. The defendant could argue that the adjustment
should not be applied because she saw the error of her ways and did not testify in the second trial to
avoid corrupting the court's fact-finding function.
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Rehal, 0 9 the defendant was charged with nine counts of cocaine distribu-
tion and one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. After the testimony
of various witnesses describing Rehal's participation in a continuing distri-
bution scheme, the defendant denied any involvement in drug trafficking,
testifying that he never used, sold or shared cocaine and had never been
involved with cocaine distribution "in any way, shape or form." 0 The jury
convicted Rehal on three counts of cocaine distribution, and acquitted on
the other distribution counts and the conspiracy count. "1 The district court
enhanced the sentence based on the defendant's perjury at trial, although it
never identified the specific instances of perjury and only made a genera-
lized finding. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence without reviewing the
record with any precision, noting that the sentencing court need not make
particular findings of perjury and that the enhancement was not clearly
erroneous. 112
It is not clear in Rehal whether the district court enhanced the sentence
because the jury convicted the defendant on three counts, thereby disbeliev-
ing at least part of his testimony, or whether the perjury caused the acquit-
tal on the other counts. If the adjustment is based on the jury's verdict,
then the sentence is the automatic application of section 3C1.1 described in
Dunnigan as a violation of the defendant's right to testify. The better ex-
planation for the enhancement is that the judge determined that the de-
fendant's perjury resulted in his acquittal on some counts. The goal of de-
terring perjury embodied in section 3C1.1 is fully served when the
defendant is punished for lying on the witness stand resulting in a miscar-
riage of justice.
In determining the sentence, the judge must weigh the testimony inde-
pendently of the jury's decision, and cannot rely on a guilty verdict to vali-
date the decision to enhance the sentence because the issue is whether the
perjury led the jury to acquit the defendant. Moveover, there is no reasona-
ble probability that applying the enhancement where the defendant's per-
jury leads to acquittal on some counts will create an intolerable burden on
the defendant's right to testify. In that instance, the court is correcting the
effect of the defendant's wrongdoing and is not simply enhancing the sen-
tence in a "wooden or reflex fashion."11 3 It is important for the district
court to specifically identify the reason for the enhancement, and to iden-
tify both the basis for the conclusion that the defendant lied and that the
109. 940 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1991).
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id. at 6, 7. The district court also stated that it enhanced the sentence because it believed the
defendant had encouraged other witnesses to lie, but the circuit court never reviewed that basis for the
§ 3C1.1 adjustment.
113. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55.
1992]
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
perjury misled the jury, in order to allow the appellate court to review the
reasonableness of the enhancement. Simply enhancing the sentence without
any explanation, as the court did in Rehal, fails to alert the defendant and
the circuit court that the judge is correcting a serious breach in the judicial
process and not merely punishing a person for exercising a constitutional
right.
The fourth scenario presents another situation supporting a sentence ad-
justment under section 3C1.1 similar to the case of acquittal on some
counts. The rationale for enhancing the sentence is broader, however, be-
cause the perjury in this scenario need not be successful in order for the
court to have a sound basis to punish the defendant. In United States v.
O'Meara,"4 one defendant in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine implicated
himself but testified that his codefendant had no knowledge of the drug
transaction. The second defendant did not testify. After both were con-
victed, the second defendant admitted his involvement to the probation of-
ficer, but the first defendant maintained his story.115 The court enhanced
the sentence for perjury at trial, and the circuit court affirmed, noting that
there was ample evidence independent of the jury verdict to support the
finding of perjury." 6
Even where both defendants are convicted, enhancement is justified to
deter codefendants from using one member of the conspiracy, especially
someone at a lower level, as a shield to take the blame and to attempt to
exonerate the other conspirators. The enhanced sentence can deter that
conduct by raising the stakes where a defendant tries to protect codefend-
ants through perjury and punishing it where the court determines that this
was the goal of the perjury." 7 A more egregious case was presented in
United States v. Fuentes,"8 where the district court found that the perjury
of one defendant in a drug conspiracy led to the acquittal on all charges of
a codefendant. The district court did not enhance the convicted defendant's
sentence because it believed that would be unfair when the other defendant
was acquitted. The Fourth Circuit properly remanded the case for further
consideration of whether an enhancement was appropriate. 1 9 When the
judge makes an independent determination that the perjury affected the
114. United States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216 (8th Cit.), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 352 (1990).
115. Id. at 1218.
116. Id. at 1220. See also United States v. Dyer, 910 F.2d 30 (8th Cir.) (following conviction of
husband and wife, court enhances sentence of wife because wife admitted involvement in drug traffick-
ing but asserted husband was innocent), cert. denied, Il1 S. Ct. 276 (1990).
117. See United States v. Jones, Nos. 90-3498, 90-3541, 90-3602, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 29800, at
*19 (7th Cit. Dec. 19, 1991) (upholding enhancement where defendant's testimony that codefendant
not involved in conspiracy was contradicted by recorded statements of codefendant after bank robbery).
118. Nos. 89-5198, 89-5217, 89-5240, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1474 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 1991).
119. Id. at *22; see supra note 94 (vacating enhancement in light of Dunnigan holding).
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jury's verdict and led to acquittal of a codefendant, then the enhancement
is entirely appropriate because the court is using its own assessment of the
defendant's credibility to correct, to a degree, the harm caused by the
perjury.
The majority of the decisions reviewing enhancements for perjury at trial
involve the third scenario, in which the defendant is convicted on all
counts. Because the jury's verdict can provide the sole basis for enhancing
the sentence, this scenario presents a greater problem in justifying applica-
tion of the section 3C1.l adjustment. Yet, assuming that the defendant
committed perjury, which is not always the case, by convicting the defend-
ant the jury (or the court) has not been misled by the perjury and the
court's truth-finding function has been preserved by the verdict. While pun-
ishing the defendant for unsuccessfully lying on the witness stand may
have some deterrent effect, allowing district courts to enhance sentences
based on the jury's verdict with no requirement that the judge make spe-
cific findings of fact creates a burden on the rights of defendants. As the
circuit courts adopt approaches similar to Bonds,120 and the jury's verdict
becomes sufficient to validate an enhancement for perjury, the Guidelines
create the real possibility that the section 3C1.l adjustment will be applied
automatically when the defendant is convicted on all counts.12" '
If the Guidelines effectively permit automatic enhancement of sentences,
then the burden on the defendant's constitutional and statutory right to
testify must be weighed against the benefit gained from deterring or pun-
ishing perjured testimony. It is important to note that the jury's evaluation
of the defendant's testimony may have the effect of strengthening the gov-
ernment's case: "[t]he consequence of a jury's disbelief of a defendant is so
great that many guilty verdicts could never have been obtained without an
assist from the poorly delivered testimony of the defendant."' 22 The jury
may decide to convict a defendant because of the perjury, or convict on
certain counts that it otherwise might not have, in which case conviction
punishes the defendant and the enhancement only piles on additional prison
time. Where the defendant is punished despite his testimony, it is not clear
how the judicial process has been seriously harmed by the allegedly false
statement.
If, on the other hand, sentences are automatically enhanced based on the
jury's verdict, this enhancement becomes an additional factor which the
120. United States v. Bonds, 933 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1991).
121. The vagueness of the Guidelines on the issue of what is required to support an enhancement has
allowed the government to argue that every defendant who testifies and is convicted should have his or
her sentence increased under § 3CL.L. The government's argument is not inconsistent with the Guide-
lines and is certainly supported by the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Bonds.
122. 4 PATRICK L. MCCLOSKEY & RONALD L. SCHOENBERG. CRIMINAL LAW ADVOCACY 8.04[11
at 8-42 (Matthew Bender 1991).
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defendant must consider in deciding whether to exercise the right to testify.
In addition to the question of whether the defendant can be an effective
witness, the defense must consider the possibility of impeachment by prior
convictions, other bad conduct under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and
the defendant's reluctance to implicate others."2 3 As the burden grows, the
possibility exists that an innocent defendant may decide against running
the risk of testifying if such testimony will result in an increased sentence,
which may limit the defense that can be put before the jury. In many
cases, the defendant's testimony is the only direct evidence that can rebut
the government's case. If defendants are discouraged from testifying, inno-
cent defendants may be convicted because of the strategic decision not to
testify.
The question, therefore, is how to balance the burden that potential en-
hanced sentences place on the defendant's right to testify with the need to
protect the integrity of the court's truth-finding function. While it is possi-
ble to eliminate the adjustment entirely as it applies to the defendant's trial
testimony, this goes too far, giving defendants a license to commit perjury.
As presently drafted, however, the Guidelines are too vague because they
permit courts to apply the section 3C1.1 adjustment automatically, an ef-
fect that cannot be accepted under Grayson's conclusion that sentences
must not be enhanced in a "wooden or reflex fashion.' 24
The Sentencing Commission should refine the Guidelines to direct the
district courts' attention to the different ways in which perjury can affect
the outcome of a trial and to the fact that the defendant's right to testify is
a vital issue that must be considered in deciding whether to enhance a
sentence where a defendant has been convicted on all counts. Although the
Guidelines currently state that section 3C1.1 is not intended to punish a
defendant for exercising a constitutional right, and that the testimony
"should be evaluated in a light most favorable to the defendant,"'125 those
admonitions have not prevented courts from using the jury's verdict to sup-
port a finding that the defendant committed perjury. 2
123. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301 n.15 (1981)(citing Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S.
333, 344 n.2 (1977)(Stevens, J. dissenting)) (giving reasons why a defendant may decide not to testify);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (same); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66
(1892) (same).
124. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55.
125. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, § 3C1.1.
126. The courts have interpreted the Sentencing Commission's statement as to the weight to be given
the defendant's testimony to mean that "the sentencing judge [should] resolve in favor of the defendant
those conflicts about which the judge, after weighing the evidence, has no firm conviction." United
States v. Franco-Torres, 869 F.2d 797, 801 (5th Cir. 1989). If the judge entertained any serious doubts
that the defendant's testimony was truthful, it is more likely that the court would order a new trial
rather than decide not to enhance the sentence for perjury. The jury's verdict can resolve any conflict
and supply the necessary certitude to apply the § 3C1.1 adjustment, and defendants have been wholly
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At a minimum, the Commission should adopt the position enunciated by
the Seventh Circuit in Lozoya-Morales127 that the district courts make spe-
cific, independent factual findings that do not rely solely on the jury's im-
plicit rejection of the defendant's testimony in its decision to convict. 28
Requiring courts to make a statement on the record will diminish, although
not eliminate, the possibility that they will simply adopt the conviction as
the basis for a section 3C1.1 adjustment. The Sentencing Commission can
go one step further by stating explicitly that sentences should not be en-
hanced by the district court based solely on the jury's verdict, and should
only be based on the judge's independent evaluation of the evidence
presented at trial and the defendant's testimony and demeanor.
A second step to ensure that the enhancement has its greatest deterrent
effect is to specify that the section 3C1.1 adjustment is most appropriate in
cases where the perjury resulted in a corruption of the court's truth-finding
function by leading to acquittal on some counts or was designed to protect
a non-testifying codefendant. The Sentencing Commission can expand the
Application Notes beyond the rather terse statement that "committing,
suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury" merits an adjustment. Sub-
orning perjury goes to acts meant to influence the testimony of other wit-
nesses, a clear interference with the truth-finding function. That conduct
should not be lumped together with the defendant's alleged perjury at trial
because suborning perjury does not implicate the defendant's constitutional
rights. Instead, the Commission should treat the issue of the defendant's
testimony separately.
In discussing the circumstances under which a court can enhance the
sentence for perjury, the Commission should counsel judges that the Guide-
lines reflect a balance between protecting both the judicial process and de-
fendants' right to testify, and the Commission should stress that enhance-
ment should only be applied in clear cases of perjury. District Courts need
a degree of discretion in applying section 3C1.1, because they are the most
familiar with the particular facts of each case, yet the need to protect de-
fendants' rights suggests that the enhancement should only be applied in
egregious cases. Without unnecessarily constraining the courts' discretion,
the Sentencing Commission could state that the perjury should be clear on
the record, and that a court should identify the need to increase the pun-
unsuccessful in using the statement in the Guidelines to argue that their testimony should be considered
in their favor.
127. United States v. Lozoya-Morales, 931 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1991).
128. This requirement is not particularly burdensome because the district court's statement need not
be detailed under Lozoya-Morales. Moreover, district courts are required to make findings of fact con-
cerning the defendant's relevant conduct and criminal history, and additional findings on the enhance-
ment will not significantly diminish judicial resources. Cf. United States v. Giles, 768 F. Supp. 101
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (published district court opinion reviewing basis for enhancement).
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ishment of the particular defendant to protect the court's truth-finding
function.' 29 Such a description of the circumstances under which a district
court can enhance the sentence will go a long way toward eliminating the
automatic application of section 3C1.1 based on the jury's verdict.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sentencing Commission needs to refine the Guidelines to avoid ex-
treme interpretations of the scope of section 3C1.l such as those in Bonds
and Dunnigan. Automatic sentence enhancement based solely on the jury's
verdict cannot be justified under the Supreme Court's holding in Grayson,
specifying that the sentencing court should not increase the defendant's
sentence for perjury at trial in some "wooden or reflex fashion.' 130 The
Guideline's sparse treatment of the issue of the defendant's testimony al-
lows circuit courts to uphold sentencing decisions that reflect little, if any,
thought by the district court about whether the defendant's testimony
amounted to perjury and whether increased punishment is appropriate. Yet
the enhancement serves an important purpose in giving the judge discretion
to protect the judicial process by punishing defendants who lie on the wit-
ness stand to avoid answering for their criminal conduct or the conduct of
co-conspirators. The Sentencing Commission needs to expand its analysis
by focusing on the effects perjury can have on the court's truth-finding
function and on how to best protect the rights of defendants. This balanc-
ing requires the Commission to give greater guidance to courts sentencing
defendants by explaining the need for specific factual findings and the im-
portance of not automatically applying the section 3C1.1 adjustment.
129. The Commission may consider recommending that judges only apply the § 3C1.1 enhancement
in egregious cases when the defendant is convicted on all counts. If the court determines that the
perjury does not rise to the level justifying an enhancement, then it can sentence the defendant to a
higher term of imprisonment within the range of sentences provided in the Guidelines. The court could
explain that it is increasing the sentence because the defendant's testimony was likely perjury but does
not meet the requirements for an enhancement, without having to make any additional findings or
risking reversal of the sentence on appeal.
130. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55.
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